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The first major public debate over the division of war-making
power between Congress and the President occurred in mid-1793 fol-
lowing President Washington's proclamation of American neutrality1
in the war which had broken out between England and France at the
beginning of that year. Defending Washington's action in a series
of newspaper articles under the disarming pseudonym of "Pacificus,"
Alexander Hamilton, a participant in the Constitutional Convention
six years earlier, argued that since war-making was by nature an execu-
tive function, Congress could exercise only those aspects of it which the
Constitution specifically grants the legislature. These grants, being
exceptions to the general rule, must be narrowly construed.2 James
Madison, a principal framer of the Constitution and co-author with
Hamilton and John Jay of The Federalist Papers, found the Consti-
tution equally clear, but to the opposite effect. Writing as "Helvidius,"
Madison asserted that war-making was a legislative function and that
any exceptions in favor of the executive must be strictly interpreted.
The debate thus opened has continued sporadically to the present
day. Most recently, limited wars in Korea and Indochina have occa-
sioned renewed interest in the question of which branch of the federal
government is constitutionally empowered to commence war.4 In the
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1. Proclamation of April 22, 1793, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELArIONs 140
(IV. Lawrie & M. Clark eds. 1833).
2. See 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 437-44 (H. Lodge ed. 1904). Specific
exceptions to the President's war-making power, as listed by Hamilton, were "the right
of the Legislature 'to declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal'." Id. at 439.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
3. See 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 138-88 passim (G. Hunt ed. 1906). Under
Madison's interpretation, the key exception to the war-making power of Congress was tile
provision that the President was "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia when called into the actual service of the United States,"
Id. at 148. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.. 4. The literature on this topic is enormous. Useful introductions may be found In
Hearings on War Powers Legislation Before the Subconzin. on National Security Policy and
Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
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course of this debate, however, constitutional scholars have generally
failed to examine thoroughly the problem of how Americans in 1787-
88 understood the war-making clauses of the Constitution.5 Such
scholarly reticence6 doubtless has some claim to prudence since Madi-
son and Hamilton, who presumably knew something about the orig-
inal intent, came to contradictory conclusions within a few years of
the Constitutional Convention. But the fact that two of tie framers
were in disagreement is thin justification for according this significant
issue inadequate treatment. Hence, by examining the debates and
proceedings which accompanied the framing and ratification of tie
Constitution, and particularly by considering ideas prevalent among
Americans of that day as they interpreted the clauses in question, I
shall attempt in this article to throw light on two important ques-
tions: (1) What was the original understanding respecting tie allo-
cation between the President and Congress of the general power to
commence war? And (2) was that power understood to include the
commencement of undeclared war?
(1971); Hearings on Congress, the President, and the War Powers Before the Subcomm.
on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Conin.u on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); M. PUSEY, THE WAY WE Go To WIt (1969): Note.
Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Conbat, 81 HArtv. L. REV.
1771 (1968); E. CORWIN., THE PRESIDENT. OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1937: HisToRY AND
ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION (4th rev. ed. 1957); HOUSE Co.M.t. ON FoREIGN AFFAIRS,
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FoRcEs IN FoPEfGiN Couv-
rmEs, H.R. REP. No. 127, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). For earlier studies, see J. ROGEmS,
WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO TIlE POWERS OF THE 1'RESIDE%T
AND CONGRESS, NINE WARS AND A HUNDRED MILITARY OPERATIONS 1789-1945 (1945); C.
BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN TIlE UNITED STATES (1921).
5. The clauses of primary significance are art. I, § 8, empowering Congress "[t]o de-
clare War [and] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal .... " and art. 11. § 2, naking
the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States .... " Of lesser importance is the clause of art. I, § 10, providing that "[In]o State
shall ... engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay." The clauses of art. I, § 8, dealing with the raising, support, gosemment,
and regulation of land and naval forces-that is, the war-supporting clauses-are outside
the scope of the present study. For debate surrounding them, see Donahoe & Sinelser, The
Congressional Power to Raise Armies: The Constitutional and Ratifying Conventions,
1787-1788, 33 REv. OF POL. 202 (1971).
6. Recent commentators have discussed the original understanding, but, regardless of
their positions on present-day issues, they have generally limited such discussions to an
examination of the one debate in the Federal Convention on changing the wording of
the clause giving Congress the power "to make war" so that it conferred power "to de-
clare war." For this debate, see 2 THE RECORDS OF TIE FEDERAL CONVENTION 318-19 (M.
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND, REcoRDs]. See, e.g., 1970 Hear-
ings on Congress, The President, and the War Powers, supia note 4, at 207. 211 (state-
ments of J. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, and W. Rehnquist, Ass't Att'y Gen.);
Bickel et al., Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis, in 116 CoNG. REc. 7117, 7122.23 (daily
ed. May 13, 1970); PUSEY, supra note 4, at 44-47 (treating some other points, but only
vaguely); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Comnunit Forces to Combat,
supra note 4, at 1773 & nn.14, 16; Wormuth, The J'ietnain War: The President versus
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I. Problems of Allocating Power: From the Articles of Confederation
to the Constitution
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress exercised both legis-
lative and executive powers. Consequently, the Articles, in dealing
with the war-making power, needed only to provide that the "United
States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right
and power of determining on peace and war." (An exception provided
that individual states might engage in war if they were actually in-
vaded or were threatened with imminent Indian attack.)7 Like the
Constitution, however, the Articles today appear somewhat ambiguous
on their face as to whether a war conducted by the United States neces-
sarily had to be a "declared" war. They conferred the "right and
power of determining on . . . war," but also referred to certain acts
the states might perform only after a congressional "declaration of
war."8 Thus, while contemplating that at least some wars would be
"declared" in form, the document did not explicitly resolve the ques-
tion of whether the nation might engage in other sorts of war.0
Whatever the case with the Confederation, in 1787 the Philadelphia
Convention drafted a Constitution which provided for a federal gov-
ernment with distinct branches, thereby necessitating some attention
to the allocation of the war-making power of the government. Yet,
while the new Constitution increased the already severe limitations
the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 710, 713-17 (R. Falk
ed. 1969); R. HULL & J. NovoGRoD, LAW AND VIETNAM 170 (1968). But see Reveley, Presi.
dential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. Rrv. 1243,
1281-85 and accompanying notes (1969) (citing other evidence from the convention itself);
R. Russell, The United States Congress and the Power to Use Military Force Abroad,
April 15, 1967, at 1-65 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy Library, Tufts University). While Russell neglects several points discussed in
the present article, see especially pp. 680-83 & pp. 688-99 infra, and gives less attention to
certain other items, see especially pp. 683-88 infra, his conclusions are generally con-
sistent with mine. Deserving special mention is Hearings on War Powers Legislation
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 7-121 passim (1972)
(statements and testimony of Professors H.S. Commager, R. Morris, and A. Kelly, Mar. 8.9,
1971), which I was able to examine only after the present article was written. This pro.
vides an excellent, albeit relatively brief, discussion of the original undeastanding of
1787-88 in the course of a broader review of the history of war-making in its constitu.
tional dimensions.
7. ARTs. oF CONFrD. arts. VI, IX. These provisions relating to war-making in the final
Articles of Confederation were virtually unchanged from the first draft of the document
in July 1776. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 549.50 (1906).
8. ARTS. OF CONFED. arts. VI, IX (italics added).
9. Since the Articles did authorize the granting of letters of marque and reprisal, the)
tacitly suggest that other sorts of hostilities were contemplated. Much depends, however,
on the types of situation to which letters of marque and reprisal were thought applicable,
and on whether such situations were to be classified as war. The same ambiguity arises
with respect to the Constitution and is discussed at pp. 692-96 infra.
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which the Articles of Confederation had placed on state war-making,10
similar explicitness did not mark the division of war-making power be-
tween Congress and the President. Nor have the records of the debates
in the Federal Convention proved an adequate guide in resolving the
ambiguities inherent in the "plain words" of the Constitution, prin-
cipally because the question of the manner in which the nation should
be committed to war was not one of the chief concerns of the dele-
gates in Philadelphia. Criticism of the Confederation government for
its inability to support federal objectives, both domestic and foreign,
had not included the complaint that the Confederation was deficient
in its ability to commit the nation to war."1
The main report of the one debate which explicitly considered
allocation of the war-making power occupies little more than one
page out of the 1,278 which contain the printed records of the Con-
vention.' - This debate occurred on August 17, 1787, while the Con-
vention was considering the clause of the draft constitution reported
by the Committee on Detail on August 6 which gave Congress the
power "to make war."' 3 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina opened
the debate by arguing that the legislature as a whole was too cumber-
some a body to exercise this power. He contended that it should be
vested in the Senate, which was smaller and would be more knowl-
edgeable in foreign affairs, and which by virtue of its treaty power"
had the authority to make peace. Pierce Butler, from Pinckney's own
state, carried the latter's argument a step further and called for vest-
ing the power in the President, but his proposal received no recorded
support. Madison and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts then "moved
to insert 'declare'; striking out 'make' war; leaving the Executive the
Power to repel sudden attacks."' 5 *This wording, from Madison's notes,
suggests that the change from "make" to "declare" was intended in
some fashion to broaden the executive's power in the war-making area.
The available record of the remainder of the debate indicates, how-
10. Under the Articles, states could grant letters of marque and reprisal after a con.
gressional declaration of war, subject to congressional regulation, while under the Con-
stitution they are absolutely forbidden to make such grants. Compare ARts. or Cosrm.
art. VI, with U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10.
11. See Farrand, The Federal Convention and the Defects of the Confederation, 2
Am. POL. Scr. REv. 532, 535-37 (1908).
12. See 2 FARRA D, REcoRws, supra note 6, at 318-19.
13. Id. at 181-82.
14. At this point in the Convention's proceedings, the Senate still had exclusive au-
thority to make treaties, the President not yet having been given power to make treaties
with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id. at 183, 592-94, 498, 538.
15. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
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ever, that the delegates may not have understood the change in such
an unambiguous way, or indeed in any one way at all. For example,
Roger Sherman of Connecticut protested that the clause as originally
reported, that is, without the Madison-Gerry amendment, "stood very
well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.
'Make' better than 'declare' the latter narrowing the power too much."
It thus appears that Sherman believed that the original wording al-
ready left the executive free to repel sudden attacks and hence that
in this respect the proposed change was nugatory. But he apparently
thought that by narrowing the power of Congress, the alteration
would unduly broaden the executive's power in some other ways. Oliver
Ellsworth, also of Connecticut, at first concurred with Sherman in
opposing the change. George Mason of Virginia, who "was against
giving the power of war to the Executive, because [he was] not safely to
be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because [it was] not so constructed
to be entitled to it... and was for clogging rather than facilitating war,"
and who on that basis might well have agreed with Sherman and Ells-
worth, instead supported the change. Madison's notes indicate that at
this point a vote on the proposed change was taken, resulting in a tally
of seven states to two in favor of the amendment. Then, in the face
of an argument advanced by Rufus King of Massachusetts "that 'make'
war might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive func-
tion," Ellsworth accepted the need for the alteration in wording and
Connecticut switched its vote, making the poll eight to one in favor
of the Madison-Gerry amendment.1 0
In editing the records of the Convention, Max Farrand concluded
that the official journal of the Convention, as regards the votes taken,
was at times unreliable, inconclusive, or both,17 and for this reason
Madison's figures are used here. If accurate, these figures indicate
that King's argument had but a marginal effect on the fate of the
Madison-Gerry amendment, since it would have passed without Con-
necticut's vote. But this is a case where the journal figures do not
accord with Madison's. The journal indicates that the Madison-Gerry
amendment initially lost by a vote of four states to five and that it was
16. Id. at 318-19. See also Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit
Forces to Combat, supra note 4, at 1773 n.16. Only nine states cast votes because Massa.
chusetts abstained on the issue, New Jersey and New York were not represented at this
point, and Rhode Island never attended the Convention.
17. 1 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra nQte 6, at xiii-xiv. Madison himself later "corrected"
some of his information to bring it into conformity with the journal, but such cmenda.
tions were not made in his notes of the debate under discussion.
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only on the second vote that the amendment carried-by an eight to one
margin.' s If the journal is accurate in its voting figures and if King's
argument was the key statement made between the two votes, then
it had a far greater effect on the outcome than Madison's account
would suggest.
The "ifs" must remain, for the record is unclear. The only cer-
tainty which emerges from the debate is that the wording was changed.
What the various delegates thought the change accomplished can only
be set forth in terms of possible interpretations: (1) the change
broadened executive power by giving the executive the authority "to
repel sudden attacks"; (2) the original wording already having given
the executive that power, the alteration broadened his power in some
more general fashion; (3) the modification lessened the chance for
involvement in war; or (4) the new wording removed any suggestion
that Congress would control the conduct of a war after it was begun.
Of these possibilities, the first two suggest an intention to broaden
the executive's power in some way. The third, and particularly the
statement of Mason from which it is derived, does not bear clearly
one way or the other on the question of executive-versus-legislative
power. The fourth possibility suggests that the change referred to
something other than the process of initially committing the nation
to war. As if to reinforce the conclusion that the change meant dif-
ferent things to different delegates, Butler of South Carolina, after
the new wording had been approved, "moved to give the Legislature
[the] power of peace as they were to have that of war." 10 In his mind,
it seems, the Madison-Gerry amendment had done little. The legis-
lature still had the power "of war."
II. Indications of an Original Understanding
If the discussion and votes on August 17 were the only source of
evidence revealing the original understanding of war-making under
the Constitution, those eager for a definite conclusion would have
due cause for despair. But the private intentions of the Convention's
delegates in changing "make" to "declare," whatever they were, did
18. 2 id. at 313-14. Russell appears more convinced than I am that the journal's record
of these votes is accurate, and he suggests that Madison may have mislabeled one of the
vote counts. His position on the largely inconclusive meaning of the debate is. however,
close to mine. See Russell, supra note 6, at 39-43.
19. 2 FAPRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 6, at 319.
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not control the way Americans of that day generally understood the
Constitution's war-making clauses. Fortunately, we can gain additional
and more conclusive evidence from (a) other deliberations of the
Federal Convention and the Constitution itself; (b) the state debates
over the ratification of the Constitution; (c) some seventeenth and
eighteenth century trends in the theory and practice of war and re-
prisal; and (d) a consideration of English influences.
A. The Convention and Its Product
In 1787 and 1788, Americans ratified the Constitution, not a set
of proceedings in the Federal Convention.20 In fact, the Convention's
records remained largely secret for thirty years.2 ' Still, the delibera-
tions in Philadelphia are worth examining for clues as to how Ameri-
cans of that day generally understood war-making in its constitutional
dimensions. The Convention's members were, after all, members of
and leaders in a broader community, so it is likely that their
fundamental assumptions were shared by other Americans. In addi-
tion, the Constitution itself provides clues to how the delegates' con-
temporaries understood war-making under it.
The plan of government submitted by Edmund Randolph on be-
half of Virginia became the focus of the Convention's first delibera-
tions. It contained no specific reference, however, to the power of
either the executive or the legislative branch to commit the nation
to war,22 but instead neatly side-stepped the question. Randolph rec-
ommended that the "National Legislature ... ought to be impowered
to enjoy [among other things] the Legislative Rights vested in Con-
gress by the Confederation" and that the "National Executive .. .
ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Con-
federation." 23 The only recorded remarks bearing on how such cri.
teria for division might affect the allocation of war-making power
came on June 1, 1787. Charles Pinckney cautioned that the powers of
war and peace might properly be classed as executive powers. James
Wilson of Pennsylvania, although admitting his preference for "a
single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility
to the office [of National Executive]," took exception: "[h]e did not
20. See, e.g., 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED SIrtA's
388-90 (1833).
21. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 6, at xi-xv.
22. See id. at 18-23.
23. Id. at 21.
678
Vol. 81: 672, 1972
War-Making Under the Constitution
consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch [which included
the power of making war] as a proper guide in defining the Executive
Powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature.
Among others that of war 9- peace &-c." Madison agreed with Wilson,"
but the resolutions which the Convention eventually passed and sent
to the Committee on Detail on July 26 were no more explicit regard-
ing the division of war-making power than Randolph's original plan
had been. In a sense they were even less explicit because they did not
contain the general proposition that the executive should enjoy the
executive powers vested in the Confederation Congress.2"
Despite the paucity of prior debate and the ambiguity of the reso-
lutions sent to it, the Committee on Detail had little trouble in allo-
cating the war-making power. Randolph and Wilson each prepared
draft constitutions which assigned the power "to make war" to the
legislature. The draft reported by the committee to the Convention
on August 6 followed the same scheme. Clearly, as the committee
sensed the will of the Convention on these points-points which, it
must be remembered, had scarcely been debated-war-making fell
almost automatically to Congress. At the same time, the committee
made the executive, now denominated the President, the Commander
in Chief of the armed forces. In view of the concurrent grant to Con-
gress of the broad power "to make war," the Presidency did not carry
with it any authority to initiate war, except perhaps the restricted power
of repelling sudden attacks which Sherman was soon to attribute to
it. After the committee reported, the Convention spent a month debat-
ing and sometimes modifying its recommendations, changing, inter
alia, Congress' power "to make war" to a power "to declare war."
The Commander-in-Chief clause, however, was passed unchanged and
without recorded debate on August 27, 1787. This expeditious, un-
remarked assent again suggests a narrow, non-controversial conception
of the clause.26
Charles Pinckney's recommendation that Congress be given the
power to grant letters of marque and reprisal was approved on Sep-
tember 5. Perhaps, as Joseph Story later contended, the Convention
24. Id. at 64-65, 70.
25. See 2 id. at 129-34.
26. These developments can be traced in id. at 143, 145, 168, 172, 182. 185, 426-28;
p. 676 supra. On the narrow view the Convention took of the President's role as Com-
iander in Chief, see especially May, "The President Shall Be Connander in Chief"
(1787-1789), in TnE ULTIMATE DECISION: TIE PREsiDEr As COMMANDER IN CIlIIEF 3-19
(E. May ed. 1960).
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desired to remove any remaining doubt about the authority of Con-
gress to authorize some form of undeclared hostilities.27 At the least,
it thus became possible for Americans in 1787-88 to draw such a con-
clusion, with their precise interpretation of the scope of the power
depending on how they understood the purpose of letters of marque
and reprisal.2 8 The Convention's final product contained all three
provisions: Congress received the power to declare war and to grant
letters of marque and reprisal, and the President became Commander
in Chief.2
0
The Convention also left several less direct clues to how the dele-
gates and their contemporaries may have understood the Constitu-
tion's war-making provisions. One is found in the plan of government
that Alexander Hamilton presented to the Convention on June 18.
This discloses that Hamilton, despite his preference for a greatly
strengthened executive, was inclined to limit severely the executive's
role in initiating war. He would have given the Senate, not the Presi-
dent, "the sole power of declaring war." The President was instead
"to have the direction of war when authorized or begun. °30 His scheme
also supports the conclusion that the delegates and their contempo-
raries in America did not understand the term "declare" in a narrow,
technical sense. On Hamilton's theory the President could direct war
only after it had been commenced. His sole reference to the com-
mencement of war, however, was the grant empowering the Senate
to declare it-yet not even in the eighteenth century were all wars
technically "declared.13 1
27. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDIS, supra note 6, at 326, 508-09; 3 STORY, supra note 20, at
63-64.
28. Despite Justice Story's comment, recent students of the war-making issue have gen.
erally neglected the significance of the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal,
which is discussed at pp. 692-96 infra. For an example of the complete omission of
this power from a list of "specific powers relevant to [the] discussion" of the original
understanding, see Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CALI'. L. REV.
1194, 1195 (1971). Secretary of State Rogers' article appeared earlier as a prepared state.
ment in 1971 Hearings on War Powers Legislation, supra note 4, at 122.
29. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, art. H, § 2.
30. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 6, at 292 (emphasis added). Notes on the plan
Hamilton presented to the convention on June 18 are found in id. at 282-93. The version
he presented in draft form to Madison late in the convention is in 3 id. at 617-30. On
Hamilton generally during the Convention, see B. MITCHELL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: YOU-rit
TO MATURITY 1755-1788, at 389-413 (1957); J. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND 'till
GRowTH OF THE NEw NATION 151-83 (1964).
31. During the debate of August 17, on the war-making clause, Elbridge Gerry (or
perhaps Madison in recording Gerry's remarks) had used "declare" in a similarly loose
sense. Pierce Butler proposed "vesting the power [i.e., the power to make war, since the
amendment to change the wording had not yet been proposed] in the President." Gerry,
commenting after Madison's and his amendment to change the wording had been offered
but before it had been voted on, and with evident reference to Butler's remark, soon
objected that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Execti.
680
Vol. 81: 672, 1972
War-Making Under the Constitution
Another clue is provided by the placement within the Constitution
of the restrictions on the power of the states to wage war independently
of the central government. In Philadelphia, limitations even stricter
than those which had been included in the Articles32 emerged during
the deliberations of the Committee on Detail and were included as
separate coordinate articles in the draft reported by that committee
to the Convention. The Committee on Style, however, placed the
prohibitions in the legislative article, where they appear in the final
Constitution.33 If the Committee on Style decided on this arrange-
ment by reasoning that any authority possessed by the states to make
war would derogate from the power of the new Congress, the com-
mittee assumed something that the Convention had never explicitly
resolved-namely, that commencing war is properly a legislative func-
tion. Like the earlier action by the Committee on Detail in assigning
the power "to make war" to Congress, the Committee on Style's action
suggests that there was no need for clarification by the Convention,
since the notion was generally accepted.
Two points may detract from the soundness of this conclusion.
First, the limitations on states placed in Article I included restric-
tions on the foreign relations power of the states.3 This would imply,
using a similar argument based on placement, that the delegates also
viewed foreign relations as properly within the legislative sphere,
despite the apparent fact that the President was given substantial
power in the foreign relations area. Offsetting the contention that on
this account the argument based on placement is unsound is the fact
that the Convention did provide the Senate with a check on tie
President's treaty-making powers, a check that George Washington
at first took especially seriously.3  In addition, it gave Congress far
tive alone to declare war." 2 FARRAND, REcORDS, supra note 6, at 318 (emphasis added).
Whether the precise wording in Madison's notes is an accurate rendition of Gerry's usage
or whether it reflects Madison's imprint is immaterial. Either alternative supports the
conclusion that "declare" did not have a very strict meaning in current American usage.
This conclusion is elaborated at p. 685, pp. 693-96 infra.
32. See note 10 supra.
33. See 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 6, at 169, 187, 577, 597; U.S. Co.sr. art. 1,
§ 10: "No State shall ... grant letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . (nor,] without the
Consent of Congress, . . . engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay."
34. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation ... [nor,] with-
out the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power .... " U.S. Co~sr. art. I, § 10. Neither here nor in the
restrictions on state war-making did the final document contain any substantive changes
from the report of the Committee on Style.
35. See R. HAYD.E,, THE SENATE AND TREATIES 1789-1817, at 1-106 (1920). Hayden con-
cludes that "Washington made treaties 'by and with the advice and consent' of the
Senate in a sense and to an extent that no later President ever has." Id. at 103.
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more power than the President in what contemporaries hoped and
thought would be the dominant and proper form of America's rela-
tions with the world-commercial relations.3 Similarly detracting
from the force of the argument based on placement is the fact that
we simply do not know much about the considerations which guided
the Committee on Style.3 7 It is quite possible that in placing the re-
strictions on state war-making, the committee and its chief drafts.
man, Gouveneur Morris of Pennsylvania, were not concerned with
the implications just discussed. Yet the suspicion remains that some-
thing more than style prompted the committee's change, since the
limitations could easily have been continued as one or more separate
articles or else placed in Article IV, which contains other provisions
relating to the states. In any event, placement of the state war-making
restrictions may have contributed to a general impression that Con%
gress was intended to be dominant in the field.
A final indirect clue to how Americans in the late 1780's under-
stood war-making under the Constitution comes from the provision
that states may not engage in war "unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."38 Although the Con-
vention had given some attention to the issue of surprise attack dur-
ing its one debate over the main war-making grant to Congress,30 this
is the only explicit reference to the matter in either the completed
Constitution or the earlier drafts. While the provision may appear
inconsequential to a late twentieth century observer, it undoubtedly
had far more meaning in the 1780's when communications and trans.
portation would not have allowed an immediate federal response to
a truly surprise attack. In such a situation, the real problem would have
been whether states might act prior to a national decision. The provi-
sion allowing state action may have seemed more consequential, too,
both because state-versus-federal authority was a major issue in the gen-
eral constitutional controversy of the day, and because the Constlitution
otherwise narrowed the sphere of permissible state activity in the
war-making area. Yet the completed Constitution contained no indi-
36. See, e.g., P. VARG, FOREIGN POLICIES OF TilE FOUNDING FATHERS 1.69 (Penguin cd.
1970); G. STOURZH, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 238-46 (2d ed.
1969); F. GILBERT, THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: To TInE FAREWELL
ADDRESS passim (1965).
37. See Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks, April 8, 1831, in 3 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 6, at 498, 499; C. ROSSiTER, 1787: TnE GRAND CONVENTION 224.30
(1966); M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TIHE UNITED STATES 181-82
(1913).
38. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
39. See pp. 675-77 supra.
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cation that the states were to have exclusive responsibility to meet
surprise attack.4 0 In sum, the question of how an observer in the late
178 0's would have interpreted the provision cannot be definitively
answered, but its presence in the Constitution at least further suggests
that Americans of that day need not have envisaged that the President
as Commander in Chief would have an especially broad role in re-
pelling sudden attack.
B. The State Ratification Debates
The state ratification debates, like the Philadelphia Convention,
were little concerned with how the new government would initiate
war. As an example, five of the eleven states which ratified the Con-
stitution before the new government commenced operation offered
amendments to it, but of the seventy-seven amendments thus proposed,
only one-from New York--dealt with the power of Congress to declare
war. Moreover, that proposal, to require a two-thirds vote in each house
of Congress for a declaration of war, was designed to protect state
or regional interests rather than to alter the balance of war-making
power between Congress and the President. By contrast, twventy-eight
of the proposed amendments concerned elections and procedures un-
der the new government, fourteen dealt with individual rights and
privileges, nine with taxation and finance, six with the raising and
maintenance of armies and control of the militia (i.e., the war-sup-
porting function) and five each with commerce and the jurisdiction
of courts.
4 '
Contemporary newspaper, pamphlet, and state convention debates
display a similar lack of attention to the allocation of the war-making
power. Although, for example, the first North Carolina convention
eventually found the Constitution objectionable enough not to ratify
40. See also p. 687 infra.
41. See Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
During the First Century of Its History, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AmF;euaN HISTOUCAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1896, at 307-09 (1897). For the texts of the amendments, see 1
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF TIlE FEDERAL CONSTrMu-
TIoN 322-31 (J. Elliot ed. 1888); 3 id. at 659.61 [hereinafter cited as ELLIoT, DEBATES].
The five states offering amendments in order of ratification, were Massachusetts, South
Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York. The amendments nearly proposed
by Maryland, those declared by the first North Carolina convention to be necessary be-
fore that state ratified, and those proposed by Rhode Island in its tardy ratification also
support the conclusions in the text. See Ames, supra, at 309-10; 1 ELuLoT, DE TES 336-37;
2 id. at 550-53; 4 id. at 244-47. In several instances my classification of an amendment
differs from that of Ames. In any event, only the New York amendment noted in ile text
and another New York amendment to prohibit the President as Commander in Chief
from commanding the Armed Forces in person (both of which are in 1 id. at 330) bore
on the external war-making powers of the proposed government.
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it, the clause giving Congress the power "to declare War [and] grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal" was "read without any observa-
tion." 42 James Winthrop in Massachusetts and Richard Harry Lee in
Virginia both objected to the increased centralization which charac-
terized the proposed government, but both agreed that the power
of war could, in Lee's words, "be lodged no where else, with any pro-
priety, but in this [the central] government."4 3 The explicit restric-
tions on state war-making in the Constitution received almost no at-
tention, adverse or otherwise, in the state debates.44 Though the
authors of The Federalist Papers were not above beating a straw man
in arguing their case,45 in Number 41 Madison commented: "Is the
power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question
in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a
proof of the affirmative." 4 The existing Confederation government
already held the power to make war. Its presence in the Constitution
could hardly be a matter of controversy. In addition, the war-making
power did not have the direct connection with such broader issues
as state-versus-federal taxation and civilian-versus-military rule that
the war-supporting powers had-the latter connection producing con-
siderable debate.
47
Yet, again like the Philadelphia Convention, the state debates
offer revealing, albeit indirect and sometimes inferential, evidence
about how contemporaries understood the Constitution's war-making
clauses. Significantly, several comments strongly hint that Americans
in 1787-88 thought the power to declare war assigned to the new Con-
42. 4 id. at 94.
43. ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1787-1788, at 98 (P. Ford cd.
1892) [hereinafter cited as FoRm, EssAYs]; PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TIlt UNITED
STATES 1787-1788, at 300-01 (P. Ford ed. 1888) [hereinafter cited as FORD, PMI'HnLErS].
44. "Almost," because Madison made cursory mention of them. See Tilt FEDErLIsr
No. 44 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (except as noted, all citations herein to The Federalist are to
the definitive Cooke edition).
45. Publius argued that opponents of the Constitution were proposing a series of
regional confederations in place of a federal union, but the latest study of the ratification
controversy in New York finds practically no talk of this sort among the state's antifed.
eralists. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 5 (J. Jay), No. 13 (A. Hamilton); L. DEPAUw, TIlE
ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK STATE AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 173 (1966).
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 269-70. I have sought to avoid over-reliance on The
Federalist as a guide to the original understanding. As Professor McLaughlin remarked
years ago, "[T]hese essays were probably of service in winning support of the Constitu-
tion; but the extent of that service we naturally cannot measure. For much imlnediate
practical effect they were perhaps too learned, too free from passion .... The Federalist
probably had more effect after the new government went into operation than in the days
of uncertainty when the fate of the union seemed to hang in the balance IT
McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 208-09 (1935).
47. See Donahoe & Smelser, supra note 5, and the citations contained therein, A.
EKIRCH, THE CIVILIAN AND THE MILITARY 27-31 (1956).
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gress was practically identical with the old Congress' power of deter-
mining on war. After stating in The Federalist Number 41 that it would
be superfluous to examine whether the power of declaring war was nec-
essary, Madison remarked: "The existing confederation establishes this
power in the most ample form." 48 In the New York convention John
Jay implicitly equated the power of the old Congress to determine
on war with the power to declare war. Robert R. Livingston was more
direct: "But, say the gentlemen, our present [Confederation] Congress
have not the same powers [as the new Congress]. I answer, They have
the very same . .. [including] the power of making war . . . ,"40 Dur-
ing the Pennsylvania convention James Wilson not only implicitly
equated declaring war and entering war, but also explicitly foreclosed
exercise of the power by the President acting alone:
This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to
guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or
a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the im-
portant power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at
large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of
the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may
draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national interest
can draw us into a war.50
Consistent with these comments indicating a broad view of the
power of the new Congress, supporters of the Constitution described
the position of the President as Commander in Chief in narrow terms.
Most notably, Hamilton contended that the office involved only com-
mand in a military sense, with no policy role. The President's au-
thority, he wrote,
would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great
Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount
to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the con-
federacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring
of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies;
all which by the constitution under consideration would ap-
pertain to the Legislature. 51
48. THE FEDERALiSr No. 41, at 270. Madison reiterated this view in the Virginia con-
vention. See 3 ELLioT, DEBAm, supra note 41, at 259.
49. 2 id. at 278, 284.
50. Id. at 528.
51. TnE FED.aaunr No. 69, at 465.
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James Iredell, who contended that "[o]ne of the great advantages at-
tending a single Executive power is the degree of secrecy and dispatch
with which on critical occasions such a power can act,'"52 nevertheless
described the office of Commander in Chief in a constrained fashion
strikingly similar to Hamilton's portrayal5
3
In accordance with this view, the federalists ignored a clear oppor-
tunity to describe the office of Commander in Chief in broad terms.
At issue was the fear harbored by contemporaries that joining the
purse with the sword would promote tyranny. There was a check in
this regard even in England, where, as Patrick Henry observed, "The
King declares war; the House of Commons gives the means of carrying
it on. '' 54 The Constitution, though, would join the two powers in the
new central government or, according to a noteworthy variation of
the argument, in Congress.55 The antifederalists, of course, preferred
to remedy the situation by giving the states greater control over taxa-
tion and the raising of armies-a solution obviously unacceptable to
the Constitution's supporters, who, however, were not themselves
united on the issue. Hamilton and Madison defended the proposed
arrangements in part by claiming that the Constitution did separate
the purse and the sword, with Congress holding the one and the Presi-
dent the other; but on balance they tended not to emphasize this divi-
sion. Instead, to meet the antifederalist argument, Hamilton and
Madison drew attention to the need for federal control of the purse
and thereby avoided stressing a broad role for the President as Com-
mander in Chief.50 Other federalists, showing even more reluctance
to take an expansive view of the executive's power in this area, pro.
duced a different and revealing defense. "Are the people of England
more secure," asked John Marshall, "if the Commons have no voice in
declaring war? or are we less secure by having the Senate [sic] joined
with the President?"57 Oliver Ellsworth posed a similar question:
[D]oes it follow, because it is dangerous to give the power of the
sword and purse to an hereditary prince, who is independent of
the people, that therefore it is dangerous to give it to the Parlia-
52. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 43, at 352.
53. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 41, at 107-08. Iredell was not inconsistent In
these two positions, for his quotation in this paragraph comes from a discussion of presi-
dential conduct during war.
54. 3 id. at 172.
55. See 2 id. at 376-77; 3 id. at 172, 378-79. For the sources of the concern over the
joining of purse and sword, see May, supra note 27; ERIRc, supra note 47, at 3.24; L.
SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY PowER 20-24 (1951).
56. See 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 41, at 348-51; 3 id. at 393-94.
57. Id. at 233.
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ment-to Congress, which is your Parliament-to men appointed
by yourselves, and dependent upon yourselves? This argument
amounts to this: you must cut a man in two in the middle, to
prevent his hurting himself. 8
When judged against future developments, "Publius" may have been
"understandably wrong . in giving a purely military cast to the
President's authority as commander-in-chief,"0 but the evidence indi-
cates that his view in this respect accorded well with that of his con-
temporaries in the state debates.
Even so, federalist comments about the desirability of governmental
energy, efficiency, and dispatch are sometimes taken to indicate a
latitudinarian view of the executive war-making power.60 Indeed,
during the ratification controversy, the federalists contended that the
proposed national government's enhanced ability to raise armies and
build fleets would promote national security, in part by deterring
surprise attack on the United States. 1 That this was a "winning issue"
suggests contemporaries were probably not convinced that the con-
stitutional provision allowing state response to surprise attack 2 was
an adequate safeguard by itself, which in turn gives color to the con-
clusion that they looked to the President to act in cases of sudden at-
tack. But during the ratification debates, the federalists never in fact
defended the presidential office on grounds that its energy and dis-
patch were required in the commencement of war against a foreign
enemy in emergency situations. What emerges instead is the conclu-
sion that they were intent on defending the national government
without regard to a particular branch.0 3
58. 2 id. at 195. Cf. comments of Edmund Randolph, who had refused to sign the
Constitution in Philadelphia and eventually voted for ratification in Virginia only after
considerable wavering. 3 id. at 201.
59. Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PArERS xiii (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). But cf.
C. RossrrER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CIitEF 67 (1951).
60. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 28, at 1196 & n.10, in which, however, the key state-
ment of the argument (the text associated with footnote 10) is simply not supported by a
reading of-the authorities cited in that footnote. On the discrepancy, compare id., with
THE FEDRAHusr Nos. 49 & 63 (both Madison, but misassigned by Rogers to Hamilton
through use of a nineteenth century edition of The Federalist), Nos. 70-75 (Hamilton).
Although certain of these numbers of The Federalist discuss the conduct and direction
of war (Nos. 70, 72, 74) and the presence of secrecy and dispatch in the Constitution's
treaty-making process (i.e., including the Senate) (No. 75), none discusses the topics of
the commencement of war or other hostilities against another nation, or the locus-of-
power problem with respect to such commencement.
61. See Marks, Foreign Affairs: A Winning Issue in the Campaign for Ratification of
the United States Constitution, 86 POL. SCI. Q. 444 (1971).
62. See pp. 682-83 supra.
63. See Marks, supra note 61, at 456-57, and the citations therein.
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In a similar vein, although the federalists undoubtedly envisioned
the Constitution as designed both to meet immediate problems and
to comprehend future demands, they seem not to have discussed the
allocation of power to commence war in the context of such a theory.
Writing in The Federalist Papers, for example, Hamilton boldly noted,
"The authorities essential to the care of the common defene... ought
to exist without limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee or define
the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent & variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them."'o
He subsequently reiterated the point: "There ought to be a capacity
to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen; and as these
are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely %to limit that
capacity."0' 5 In the first instance, however, he was specifically con-
cerned with the powers "to raise armies-to build and equip fleets-
to prescribe rules for the government of both-to direct their opera-
tions-to provide for their support." In the second, he was considering
the problem of providing an adequate revenue for the proposed gov-
ernment. In sum, although defending the notion of a flexible, ex-
pandable Constitution, these statements plainly refer to immediate
problems other than that of commencing war. Moreover, Hamilton's
broad purpose in both instances was to defend federal power, once more
without specification of branch, against exceptions and reservations
in favor of the states.66
Of course, their silence does not necessarily mean Americans in
the late 1780's rejected the idea that the President had responsibility
to respond to sudden attack. Particularly in view of the common ex-
pectation that George Washington would be the first President, 07 it
is conceivable that they simply and tacitly assumed that there would be
a presidential role in this regard. There was certainly sentiment present
in the Federal Convention that "[t]he Executive shd. be able to repel
... war" as Roger Sherman had explained.0 8 What the preponderance
of evidence suggests, however, is that if men of the day generally shared
such an assumption, they still conceived of the President's war-making
role in exceptionally narrow terms.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147.
65. Id. No. 34, at 211.
66. See id. Nos. 23, 34. See generally id., Nos. 23-36 (A. Hamilton).
67. See, e.g., 6 D. FREEMAN, GEORGE WASHINGTON: A BIoGRAriiy 117 & n.1 (1954).
68. See pp. 675-77 supra.
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C. The Theory and Practice of War and Reprisal
Americans of the revolutionary generation paid considerable atten-
tion to a broad range of European and especially English ideas and
controversies involving law, government, and international affairs. 0
The works of Hugo Grotius,70 Samuel Pufendorf, 1 Emmerich de
Vattel,72 and particularly Jean Jacques Burlamaqui73 were widely
read and quoted.74 Books by Thomas Rutherforth7 and Richard
Lee76  (whose work was largely a popularization of the views of Cor-
nelius van Bynkershoek) 77 appear to have been less widely read but
still received attention.78 Many of the fairly well educated and cosmo-
69. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF TIHE A.MERIcAN REVOLUT1ON 22-54
(1967); 1 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF TIHE LEGAL PROFESSION IN A.IERICA: ThE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE 33-37 (1965); T. COLBOuR', THE LAMP OF EXi'ERIENCE: WiIG HISTORY AND THE
INTFLLEcTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERIcAN REVOLUTION (1965); GILRT, supra note 35; M.
KRAUS, THE ATLANTIc CIVILIZATION: EIGHTEENTII CENTURY ORIGINS (1949); Bail)n, Political
Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth.Century America, 67 Ass. Hisr. RE%.
339 (1962).
70. H. GROTiUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (1625; J. Barbeyrac trans. 1738) (to
facilitate reference, here and in the following notes I have indicated both an early edition
and the edition I used) [hereinafter cited as GROrsUS].
71. S. PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW oF NATURE AND NATIoNs (1688; C. &I W. Oldfather
transl. 1934) [hereinafter cited as PUFENDORF].
72. E. DE VATrEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS (1758; 2 vols. in 1, trans. from French 1759.60)
[hereinafter cited as VATrEL].
73. J. BURLA.MAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAw (2 vols., T. Nugent
trans. 1752; 3rd ed. 1784) [hereinafter cited as BURLI.MAQUI].
74. See BAILYN, supra note 69, at 27-29; P. HA.tiN, LEGAL E..DUCTION IN COLONIAL
NEW YORK 197-99 (1939); R. HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES BURLA.MAQUI: A LiIERAL TRADmoN
IN AImERICAN CONsTrrtiONALSM 79-105 (1937); C. WARR', A HistoRY OF ThE A. EttuAN
BAR 163, 181-82 (1911); B. WRIGHT, AmEtRICAN INTERiRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw 7.8. 44,
50-51, 58, 60, 67, 79, 89-90 (1931); Weinfeld, ll'hat Did the Framers of the Federal Con-
stitution Mean by "Agreements and Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 453, 458.59 (1936);
cases cited in note 76 infra. BAILYN, supra, at 28, cautions, however, that the Americans'
knowledge of these works was sometimes superficial; but this was probably less true of
the lawyers who used them.
75. T. RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL Lv (2 vols. 1754-56; Am. Ed. 1799) (also
spelled Rutherford) [hereinafter cited as RUTHERFORTjI].
76. R. LEE, A TREATISE OF CATURES IN WAR (1759) [hereinafter cited as LIE].
77. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, A TREATISE ON TIlE L-W OF WVAR: BEING TuE First Boor
OF HIS QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI (1737; P. DuPonceau trans. 1810) [hereinafter cited as
IBYNKERSHOEK].
78. In November 1782 the Confederation Congress appointed a connittee to compile
a list of books to be purchased for its use. In January 1783 the committee reported a list
of 309 books, only to have the budget-minded Congress decline to buy them. The list,
which is indicative of recommended reading for the statesman of the 1780's and of whiidI
James Madison was probably the principal author, included not only Lee and Ruther-
forth but also Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui. Lee was in Thomas Jefferson's
library for the period. Luther Martin read portions of Rutherforth to the Constitutional
Convention (Farrand in the index to his RECORDS lists this as Samuel Rutherford, but
Madison's and Yates' notes contain no indication of a first name, Thomas Rutherforth's
name was spelled both Rutherford and Rutherforth, and the context would suggest it
was Thomas Rutherforth's work which was being read); Hamilton quoted Rutherforth
in Federalist 84; and James Wilson cited Rutherforth in his 1790.91 law lectures. B)nker-
shoek's Quaestionum appears to have been much less well-known, with, die 1783 "states.
man's" list merely giving the title of another book of his, followed by "with all his other
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politan men to whom the deferential American society of that day
looked for leadership79 thus must have been familiar with these
treatises. Among the topics the treatises considered were several which
helped illuminate the war-making power of the new government being
considered in 1787-88. Consequently, these works, in conjunction with
historical trends visible in the late eighteenth century, offer further in-
sight into the original understanding of war-making under the Con-
stitution, and particularly the problem of undeclared war.
The writers in question discussed the necessity of declarations of
war, but reached no consensus. Although none of them held a declara-
tion necessary in a defensive war, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel
thought one required in a non-defensive war, if that war was to be
legal with respect to the consequences attaching to it (for example,
immunity from criminal prosecution for those waging it). Burlamaqui,
however, was not entirely clear on the point. He stated that in a non.
defensive war a declaration "ought" to be issued as a token of the
respect which sovereigns should show each other, and so left unclear
whether there was here a legal obligation or only some principle of
comity. The remaining authors contended that a declaration was never
legally necessary, but they agreed with Burlamaqui that it was desir-
able in that it put neutrals on notice to observe their obligations
toward the belligerents and allowed the enemy one last chance to
give satisfaction. Several of the writers stated that a declaration might
be either absolute or conditional. The absolute declaration was a sim-
ple and unconditional announcement of war. The conditional declara-
tion was essentially an ultimatum, that is, a demand that the enemy per-
form some act, coupled with a warning that otherwise war would fol.
low as a matter of course with no further notice.8 0
works." Within several years of the Constitution's framing and ratification, Lee, Ruther.
forth, and Bynkershoek were all extensively cited by counsel in a number of prize cases
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. See L. Smith, The Library List of 1783, 1969, at 2-3,
123-25, 127, 129-30 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Honnold Library of the Clare-
mont Colleges); 2 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY Or THOMAS JEFFERSON 74 (E. Sowerby comp,
1953); 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 6, at 438, 440; 4 id. at 209; 1 TtE WoRKs oF JAMLS
WILsoN 163, 192 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967); THE FEDERALIST No. 84; Glass v. The Sloop
Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 6 (1794); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133 (1795); M'Donough
v. Dannery and the Ship Mary Ford, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 188 (1796); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S.
(4 DalI.) 37 (1800).
79. See Pole, Historians and the Problem of Early American Democracy, 67 Am. HSiS,.
REv. 626 (1962). In saying that American society of the 1780's was deferential, I do not
intend to become involved in the much-debated question of whether it was "democratic,"
politically or otherwise. Deference and democracy are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
80. See GROTIUs 57-58, 552-55; 1'UFENDORF 1294-95, 1307 (Pufendorf mainly refers Ills
readers to Grotius on the subjects of declarations of war and reprisals); 2 VA^rEL 3, 21-26;
2 BURLAMAQUi 269-72; BYNKERSHOEK 6-27; LEE 13-39; 1 RUTIERFORTII 451, 2 id. at 522.23,
549-53.
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It must initially be recognized that when these authors spoke of
declarations of war, they generally meant formal announcements to
the enemy with proper ceremony, usually in his capital.8 ' In point of
fact, however, European states had not made such declarations for well
over a century.8 2 The common practice was to publish an announce-
ment domestically and to inform the enemy, if at all, by means of a
written communication such as a diplomatic note.8 3 To cope with
the disparity between theory and practice, Burlamaqui had sought
to distinguish between a "declaration" and a "publication" of war.84
But, with the possible exception of two American treaties concluded
during the revolutionary and Confederation periods,85 there appears
to have been no acceptance of this distinction in the United States. 0
In view of these facts, it seems probable that a contemporary would
have taken "declaration of war," as used in the treatises, to mean what
nations had customarily done in "declaring" war during the preceding
century or so.8
7
Once that equation was made, the treatises may well have affected
the way those who debated the Constitution in 1787-88 understood
the document. One intriguing possibility is that a person familiar with
the literature on conditional declarations of war could easily have
concluded that Congress might conditionally authorize the President
81. See citations in note 80 supra.
82. This may have been what Hamilton had in mind when he wrote that "the cere-
mony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse . TE FErnAtsr
No. 25, at 161.
83. See G. MAART.Ns, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS FOUNDED IN TIlE TREATIES AND
CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 274-75 (1788; W. Cobbett trans. 1795);
2 J. WVESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21 (2d ed. 1913).
84. 2 BuRLAMiAQUI 272-73. Vattel hinted at the same distinction (see 2 VATrE, -25).
but generally used "declaration" to include both formal denunciation to the enemy and
publication.
85. In their English (i.e., American) texts, the Treaties of Amity and Commerce with
France, Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12 (1778), T.S. No. 83, and the Netherlands, Oct. 8, 1782, 8
Stat. 32 (1782), T.S. No. 249, used the phrase "proclamation of war" in articles (22 and 18,
respectively) relating to the effects oF an announcement of war within the announcing
nation and used "declaration of war" elsewhere. The French and Dutch texts did not
observe the distinction. See 8 Stat. 12, 32 (1778, 1782), 2 T.LA.S.. 2 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AsErucA 3, 59 (H. Miller ed. 1931). The
original instructions of the Continental Congress regarding the French treaty (the so.called
Treaty Plan of 1776) also included the distinction. See 5 JouR., ALs OF TIlE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 774 (1906). Other contemporary American treaties ignored it.
86. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Sweden, April 3. 1783, 8 Stat. G0
(1783), T.S. No. 346, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AI.s, supra note 85, at 123;
Convention of Peace, Commerce, and Navigation with France, Sept. 30, 1800, 8 Stat. 178
T.S. No. 85, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs, supra, at 457. These used "dec-
laration of war" in contexts similar to those in which the treaties cited in note 85 supra
used "proclamation of war."
87. That at least some writers in the general period did so is seen in J. KEN, Dstm-
TATIONS, BEING THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LmW LEctuRES 66 (1795); MIIE.%5.
supra note 83, at 274-75.
The Yale Law Journal
to conduct a war if another nation refused to meet American de.
mands.s8 More importantly, though, the treatise writers' contention
that declarations were not needed in defensive wars raised the question
of undeclared war, and this was a matter that the treatises consid-
ered at some length.
Grotius had argued that declared war was "perfect" war in the sense
of being complete-that is, involving whole nations on each side. Ac-
cordingly, undeclared war was "imperfect." The latter occurred
"where no perfect War is absolutely denounced; yet where a certain
violent protection of our rights is necessary," with the violence con-
sisting of state-authorized private reprisals directed at property held
by the subjects of another nation. 9 The later commentators agreed
that imperfect war and reprisals were closely related, if not iden-
tical, but they took a broader view of what constituted reprisals, hold-
ing that states using public forces might themselves make reprisals.
Burlamaqui's view is representative:
A perfect war is that which intirely interrupts the tranquillity of
the state, and lays a foundation for all possible acts of hostility.
An imperfect war, on the contrary, is that which does not intirely
interrupt the peace, but only in certain particulars, the public
tranquillity being in other respects undisturbed.
. .. This last species of war is generally called reprisals, of the
nature which we shall here give some account. By reprisals then
we mean that imperfect kind of war, or those acts of hostility
which sovereigns exercise against each other, or, with their con-
sent, their subjects, by seizing the persons or effects of the subjects
of a foreign commonwealth, that refuseth to do us justice . . ..
88. It would probably be anachronistic to equate such a view with permissiveness
toward delegation of power in the modern sense.
89. See GRoTtus 538-49 (the quotation is at 540). See also id. at 57-58.
90. 2 BURLAMAQUI 258. See LEE 20, 40-51; 2 RUTHERFORTIH 485, 516, 522-23, 537.-53
1 VATrEL 249-51; 2 id. at 25-26 (but Vattel's equation of imperfect war with rcprisals is
less completely developed than that of the other writers); 1 M. HALE, HIsToRIA l'LACITOIItM
CORONAE: THE HisroRy OF THE 1PLEAS OF THE CROWN 162 (S. Emlyn ed. 1736). Hale's corn.
ments in this regard are particularly significant, because, compared with other English
jurists prior to Blackstone, "Hale was a particularly well-known and attractive figure"
to Americans. BAILYN, supra note 69, at 30 n.ll. It is also noteworthy that language prac-
tically identical to that in the first paragraph of the quotation from Burlamaqul was
included, but without citation in Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 21
(Ct. App. in Cases of Capture 1781). Suggestive of the broadened concept of reprisals is
this comment from an American about twenty )'ears after the framing and ratification
of the Constitution:
Reprisals are either general or special.-They are general when a sovereign, who
has or thinks that he has received an injury from another prince, issues orders to his
military officers, and delivers commissions to his subjects to take the persons and
property of the other nation, wherever the same may be found. It is, at present, the
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There was consensus that imperfect war and state reprisals, commonly
called general reprisals, could easily lead to perfect war.1
These opinions of the eighteenth century authors comported with
two features of recent history, as seen in the late 1780's. First, hostili-
ties without declarations of war were common during the period. In-
deed, the undeclared hostilities in 1754-56 which marked the beginning
of the Seven Years War between Britain and France, occurred mainly in
America. During the War of the American Revolution, moreover,
Britain and France never expressly declared war on each other, unless
France's treaty with the United States may be so construed.12 The
second feature involved the practice of European states with respect
to reprisals. From the twelfth through the seventeenth centuries,
these states had regularized and legitimated private reprisals in time
of peace by the sovereign's granting of letters of marque and reprisal
to individuals who had specific claims against subjects of other states.
Such letters authorized seizure of the property and sometimes the per-
sons of the other state's subjects. When issued during war, the letters
empowered individuals who were not members of public armed forces
to take from the enemy and his subjects. Then, during the first half
of the eighteenth century, the practice of granting letters of marque
and reprisal for satisfaction of private claims during peace virtually
disappeared. States, however, continued to make reprisals to press their
own claims, using both public naval forces and private ships sailing
under privateer commissions or letters of marque and reprisal. These
state or general reprisals not uncommonly resulted in outright war.
English history furnished several such examples which were undoubt-
edly familiar to those who debated the Constitution: the wars with
the Netherlands in 1652 and 1664, with Spain in 1739, and with
France in 1756 were all preceded by public naval reprisals.03
first step which is generally taken at the commencement of public war, and is con-
sidered as equivalent to a declaration of it.
Special reprisals are granted, in time of peace, to individuals who have suffered
an injury from the subjects of another nation ....
BYNKERSHOEK 182 n. * (trans. note). See generally 7 J. MooRE, A DIGEST OF I Tn.'ATIONAL
LAW 119-30 (1906).
91. See 2 BURLAMAQUI 261; LEE 20, 45; 1 VArr.L 250. See also GnorTis 57.60. While
Rutherforth does not explicitly deal with the point, neither does he contradict the con-
clusions of the other writers on it.
92. See J. MfAURICE, HOSTILITIES VITHOUT Drct.4 xto.v OF WAR 1700-1870. at 12-26
(1883); 3 R. PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 110-15 (1857); 2 IVEsTLAKE,
supra note 83, at 22-23. Phillimore contends (at 115) that France's announcement of her
American treaties in 1778 had the effect of a declaration.
93. See A. HINDMARsH, FORCE IN PEACE: FORCE SHORT OF WAR IN INTMnNATIONAL RE.A-
TIONs 43-56 (1933); 3 PHiLX.IMORE, supra note 92, at 108-09, 118; maccob), Reprisals as a
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In sum, familiarity with Grotius and his successors and with then-
recent history would have suggested to one in the late 1780's that un-
declared war was no oddity and that the issuance of letters of marque
and reprisal for satisfaction of private claims was outmoded. An Ameri-
can who was knowledgeable about these topics therefore faced the prob-
lem of explaining the Constitution's use of the wording "declare" and
"letters of marque and reprisal." He might have done this in several
ways, but certain interpretations would have made more sense to him
than others.
In regard to the word "declare," he might have settled on any of a
variety of possibilities:
(1) America would restrict herself to fully declared wars. However,
this interpretation would have run counter to the prevalence of un-
declared war in the eighteenth century, which would have been a mat-
ter of some importance to a generation that made a practice of deriving
lessons from history.04 In addition, it would have contradicted a goal
of the new diplomacy with which Americans were so enamored,
namely, that force should be restricted and the effects of war con-
trolled.95 Indeed, in 1785 provisions reflecting this goal had been in-
cluded in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United
States and Prussia.96 But fully declared wars were less likely to be lim-
ited in their material dimensions.
(2) The provision giving Congress the power to declare war was
merely a formality. In practice, America would avoid war by limiting
her relations with the world to trade and commerceY7 Many Americans
undoubtedly hoped the United States could remain aloof from war,
but a generation which avidly followed European affairs, which had
confronted European activities in America and Barbary depredations
in the Mediterranean during the 1780's,08 and which contained some
Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 CAaiB. L.J. 60, 60-67 (1924); 1 LETrERS AND PAIERS
RELATING TO THE FIRST DUTCH WAR 1651-54, at 301-02 (S. Gardiner ed. 1899); 2 THE RoYAL
NAVY: A HISroRY 422-25 (W. Clowes ed. 1898); 3 id. at 51-52, 266-67; 1 J. CoRnEr, ENC-
LAND IN THE SEVEN YEARS WAR 83 (2d ed. 1918).
94. See Adair, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide": History, Democratic Theory,
and the 'United States Constitution in THE REINTERIRETATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HlIS-
TORY 129 (R. Billington ed. 1966); COLBOURN, supra note 69 passim and especially 4.6, 185.
95. See generally works cited in note 36 supra.
96. Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Prussia, Sept. 10, 1785. 8 Stat. 84, 94-96, T.S.
No. 292, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS, supra note 85, at 162, 178-79. This
provision followed the instructions of Congress. See 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 358-59 (1928).
97. See T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 22-23 (Liberal Arts
Press ed. 1953). See generally the works cited in note 36 supra.
98. See, e.g., T. BAILEY, A DInLoMATIc HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOrLE 52-65 (8th cd.
1969).
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eminent realists 9 would hardly have counted on the complete disap-
pearance of war.
(3) Congress' power to declare war was to be interpreted strictly;
as a result the Constitution left the waging of undeclared war unac-
counted for. Authority over it must have been either unvested or per-
haps somewhat deviously vested in the executive branch. It seems un-
likely, however, that an observer in 1787-88 would have concluded
that the Constitution would leave such an important power unvested.
Certainly no one commented on the omission. It also seems improb-
able that a contemporary would have accepted the alternative that the
power was lodged with the executive. Contemporaries spoke and wrote
in narrow terms of the President's sole martial role as Commander in
Chief.100
(4) As used in the Constitution, "declare" had a broader meaning
than it did in the treatises and international practice. It meant "com-
mence." This interpretation, unlike the first three possibilities I have
discussed, would probably have seemed plausible to someone in 1787-
88, because contemporary statements suggested that the power of the
new Congress to commence war would be at least as broad as that of
the Confederation Congress.101 This deviation from international usage
would have seemed proper, as well, since the Constitution involved
domestic arrangements.
(5) Whatever the scope of the term "declare" as used in the Consti-
tution, any war-commencing power not covered by it was vested in
Congress by virtue of that body's control of reprisals. This possibility,
which is at once distinguishable from, yet compatible with interpreta-
tion (4), would also have seemed plausible because the treatises closely
assimilated imperfect war and reprisals.
The last interpretation suggests the need for more detailed con-
sideration of how an observer, acquainted with the treatises and the
relevant history, would have interpreted the Constitution's grant to
Congress of power to issue letters of marque and reprisal. Here, too,
there are several possibilities:
(1) The phrase "letters of marque and reprisal" was used in the
Constitution in a technical sense and was intended to give Congress
authority to grant such letters to private individuals in both peace and
99. See, e.g., P. Hors'rAmER, THE A.MERICAN POLTICAL TAmwmo. AND TimE ME., Wnio
MADE IT 3-17 (1954).
100. See pp. 679-80, 685-87 supra.
101. See p. 685 supra.
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war. This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that special letters
of marque and reprisal, for the peacetime satisfaction of private claims,
had fallen into disuse and general reprisals had become the rule. As a
necessary and proper concomitant of the powers to commence and
conduct war, letters could be issued in war whether or not the Con-
stitution mentioned them. In fact, if granted during a declared war
as a military measure, there could be little objection to their being
granted by the President, who, as Commander in Chief, was charged
with the conduct of war. Under this interpretation, then, the phrase
would have been archaic and redundant in intent.
(2) The power was merely a careless and meaningless carry-over
from the Articles of Confederation.10 2 A contemporary would have
noted, though, that the Convention had given new attention to the
problem of letters of marque and reprisal. The states, which could
issue such letters in time of war under the Articles, were altogether
prohibited from issuing them under the Constitution.103 Thus it
would have seemed unlikely that the retention of the power was mean-
ingless.
(3) The phrase most importantly conferred on Congress power over
general reprisals outside the context of declared war. While the word-
ing in question admittedly spoke broadly of granting "letters of
marque and reprisal," issuance of the special variety had passed out
of fashion in peace time. The clause thus could easily have been in-
terpreted as serving as a kind of shorthand for vesting in Congress
the power of general reprisal outside the context of declared war.104
For someone in the late 1780's, this interpretation, far more than
the first two, would have given the phrase meaning and would have
been consistent with history and the treatises. Once accepted, this
102. Of course, what we know about the history of the clause in the Philadelphia
Convention (see p. 679 supra) was generally unknown in 1787-88.
103. ARTS. oF CONFED. art. VI; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
104. The making [of] a reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing. Remonstrance
and refusal of satisfaction ought to precede; and when reprisal follows, it is consid.
ered an act of war, and never failed to produce it in the case of a nation able to
make war; besides, if the case were important and ripe for that step, Congress must
be called upon to make it; the right of reprisal being expressly lodged with them
by the Constitution, and not with the Executive.
Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of State, May 16, 1793, quoted in 7 J. MooRE, INT'L
LAW DIGEST 123 (1906) (emphasis added). On the matter of the wording regarding reprisals
serving as shorthand, cf. L. LEVY, ORIGINS oF THE FIFrT AMENDMENT 430 (1968): "[C]on.
stitution-makers, in that day at least, did not regard themselves as framers of detailed
codes. To them the statement of a bare principle was sufficient ...." The same point
might also be made in connection with the equation of "to declare war" and "to comn
mence war."
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interpretation in turn would have given increased plausibility to the
view that Congress possessed whatever war-commencing power was
not covered by the phrase "to declare war."
In short, while one cannot pretend that the matter is beyond all
doubt, it seems plain that knowledge of the theory and practice of war
and reprisal would have helped convince a late-eighteenth century
American that the Constitution vested Congress with control over the
commencement of war, whether declared or undeclared.
D. English Influences
If, as the preceding discussion indicates, Americans in 1787-88 saw
Congress as having the dominant voice in the commencement of war,
they were breaking with English constitutional theory under which
war-making was a Crown prerogative.1x0- This is not surprising, for
the scope of executive power in America narrowed considerably after
independence. In the late 1780's, of course, the trend toward weaker
executives was reversed. The reversal, however, resulted from do-
mestic considerations-stronger and more independent leadership
seemed necessary to insure liberty and stability within the country-
and it had little or no connection with external problems of war-
making.100 Departure from English theory concerning the initiation
of war was therefore consistent with broader developments in post-
independence America.
Although the English theoretical model lost favor in America, pridr
English experience and thought were still quite relevant to the
evolving American view of war-making. Even in England itself, prac-
tice did not coincide with theory. In the seventeenth century, Sir
Matthew Hale had written: "The power of making war or peace...
in England is lodged singly in the King, tho it ever succeeds best when
done by parliamentaiy advice."107 In 1775 another student of the
English constitution, Jean de Lolme, commented that the King
has the prerogative of commanding armies, and equipping fleets
-but without the concurrence of his Parliament he cannot main-
tain them .... He can declare war-but without his Parliament
105. 1 W. BLASTONE, COMENTARIES 0249-50.
106. See G. WOOD, THE CRE.,Ino OF THE AtEsar-Az REPUBLIC 1776-1787 passimn and
especially at 393-564 (1969).
107. 1 HALE, supra note 90, at 159 (emphasis added).
697
The Yale Law Journal
it is impossible for him to carry it on. In a word, the Royal pre-
rogative, destitute as it is of the power of imposing taxes, is like
a vast body, which cannot of itself accomplish its motions .... 108
Hale and de Lolme, of course, were not directly considering the theo-
retical locus of the war-making power in England. They asserted only
that parliamentary control over the war-supporting function provided
practical checks on the King's prerogative. On the basis of such analy.
ses, however, the English system did not present a polar contrast to
the evolving American notions of congressional control over war-
making. Rather, it contained elements which, on the one hand, were
imitated in the American Constitution with its provisions for a clear
legislative monopoly of the war-supporting function, and, on the other,
suggested tendencies toward legislative control of the war-making
function itself.1 9
Other English sources which Americans probably noted would have
led them to similar conclusions about the desirability of a diminished
executive role in war-making. The English commonwealthmen of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whose views were especially ap-
pealing in America, admittedly did not emphasize the problem of war-
making as such. Their major concern regarding military matters was
that standing armies posed a domestic threat. Their outlook nonethe-
less generally favored a diminished executive role.1 0 The same was
true of the broider group of Whig writers who proved so popular in
revolutionary America."' In 1774, James Burgh went so far as to imply
that Parliament should have a substantial and independent voice not
only in the supporting of war, but also in its commencement, conduct,
108. J. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 48 (1775). See generally id. at 47.62.
109. Of course, the development of cabinet government in England blocked the growth
of an independent parliamentary check on the executive. The cabinet, with or without
the Crown's connivance, came both to exercise executive functions and to manage par.
liament. But to the extent that they were aware of these tendencies toward cabinet gov.
ernment, eighteenth century Americans deprecated them as manifestations of the corrup.
tion-that is, the improper use of influence-which they thought was so generally menacing
to a proper balance in government and hence to liberty. See B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS oF
AMERICAN POLITICS 14-58 (1968) M. TnOMasoN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
1642-1801, at 353-84 (1938).
110. See C. ROBBINS, TIE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COMMONWEALTHIMAN (1959). But at
least one of the commonwealthmen, Henry Neville (1620-1694), was explicit in his desire
to "take from the king the power of making war and peace .... Id. at 39. Far front
a coherent group, the English Commonwealthmen or Real Whigs were intellectual
descendants of the Puritan revolutionaries of the 1640's and 1650's. They had republican
and non-conformist tendencies and were enamored of natural right theories, freedom of
thought, limited government, and parliamentary reform. By the end of the eighteenth
century, they had merged into the broader stream of English radicalism. See id. passin.
111. See CoLBoua, supra note 69, passim.
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and conclusion.112 John Locke, writing some ninety years earlier, had
separated what he called the federative power, which included war-
making, from the ordinary executive power. He saw the same authority
as properly exercising both powers, but his separation of them for
purposes of analysis may have aided in establishing a basis for their
later actual separation.1 3 At any rate, Thomas Rutherforth was ex-
plicit in his opinion in the 1750's that war-making was a legislative
function because it had to rest on the "common understanding" of
the nation. 1 4 All considered, it is not surprising to find that at the
Philadelphia Convention James Madison and James Wilson charac-
terized war-making as properly legislative.11
III. Conclusion: The Original Understanding in Theory and Early
Practice
Although the change from "make" to "declare" in the clause em-
powering Congress "to declare War" was open to several interpreta-
tions among the members of the Philadelphia Convention, there is
enough evidence to allow some cautious generalization about the orig-
inal understanding concerning war-making. The Confederation Con-
gress exercised both legislative and executive functions; the new Con-
gress would not. Nevertheless, specific remarks equating the war-
making powers of the two Congresses, together with other comments
about war-making lieing a legislative function, suggest that contem-
poraries thought the power of the proposed legislature to commence
war would be as broad as that of the Confederation Congress. Since
the old Congress held blanket power to "determine" on war, and since
undeclared war was hardly unknown in fact and theory in the late
eighteenth century, it. therefore seems a reasonable conclusion that
the new Congress' power "to declare War" was not understood in a
narrow technical sense but rather as meaning the power to commence
war, whether declared or not. To the extent that the power was more
narrowly interpreted, however, the new Congress' control over letters
112. See I J. BURGH, POLITICAL DisQusrrio.s: OR AN ENQRumy L%'ro Punuc Ennots,
DEFEcrs, AND ABUSES ... 371 (1774). See also id. at 193-95, 414.45.
113. See J. LocrE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF Gov u'.msr 83-84 (Liberal Arts Press ed.
1952).
114. 2 RUTHERFORTH 64-67.
115. See p. 679 supra. See also 1 THE WoRKs OF JAMEs WILSON, supra note 78, at
433-34 (Wilson's 1790-91 law lectures).
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of marque and reprisal must have suggested to contemporaries that
it would still control "imperfect"-that is, undeclared-war. Otherwise,
the provision involving such letters would have seemed practically
meaningless in view of the status of reprisals by the late 1780's. Taken
together, then, the grants to Congress of power over the declaration
of war and issuance of letters of marque and reprisal likely convinced
contemporaries even further that the new Congress would have nearly
complete authority over the commencement of war. Reinforcing the
same conclusion is the fact that English experience, and particularly
the English Whigs to whom Americans paid considerable attention,
offered hints about the desirability of legislative supremacy in this
area. It remains possible that the President as Commander in Chief
was tacitly accorded the initiative to meet sudden attacks on the United
States. In their public statements, however, contemporaries assigned
him the restricted military role of conducting war once it had begun.
In any event, the Constitution explicitly authorized the states to act
in the face of surprise attack.
The consensus which existed in 1787-88 on the war-making issue
did not last, and Hamilton as "Pacificus" began lodging reservations
as early as 1793. It is significant, though, that his position appears not
to have been an especially persuasive one even to his fellow Federal-
ists," 6 let alone to the Republicans. In 1795, James Kent contended
that in the United States "war only can be commenced by an act or
resolution of Congress," indicating that he equated "declare" with
"commence."' 117 The undeclared hostilities with France during John
Adams' administration were authorized by Congress,"18 and despite
debates over the extent to which specific legislative measures provided
a basis in law for action against the French, the notion that authoriza-
tion must come from Congress was seldom challenged." 09 At one point,
when the Republicans in the House of Representatives proposed to
modify and weaken legislation authorizing American naval reprisals
against the French, an exasperated Federalist protested that preserva-
tion of American rights required the legislation to be passed un-
amended, because "the President has not the power to act in the
116. That is, members of the Federalist Party, not to be confused with the lower case
'T' federalists of the ratification controversy in 1787-1788.
117. KENT, supra note 87, at 83.
118. See A. DECONDE, TIlE QUASI WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF TIlE UNDE-
CLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801 passim and especially at 89.98 (1966).
119. See, e.g., THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINCS IN THE CONGRESS OF TIlE UNITED STATES,
5th Cong., 2d Sess. cols. 1440-1522, 1783, 1798-1812, 1815-35 (1798).
700
Vol. 81: 672, 1972
War-Making Under the Constitution
[present] case. Congress only [can] authorize reprisals."' 20 Retreating
from the position he had earlier taken as "Pacificus," Alexander
Hamilton held that the Constitution narrowly constrained the Presi-
dent's actions. Adams might authorize the repelling of actual attacks,
but he could not make reprisals without congressional approval.1 21
In two maritime prize cases arising out of the Quasi-War, the Su-
preme Court of the United States evinced similar views. The seriatim
opinions in Bas v. Tingy (1800)122 stressed that whether hostilities
were declared or undeclared, they still constituted war-being perfect
and general war in the one case, and imperfect and limited war in the
other. None of the Justices explicitly stated that only Congress might
wage imperfect war, but that conclusion was clearly implicit in their
remarks. 12 3 In Talbot v. Seeman (1801), a case involving the salvage
rights of Silas Talbot and his officers and crew, John Marshall, the
newly appointed Chief Justice, forthrightly stated: "The whole powers
of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in con-
gress, the acts of that body alone be resorted to as our guides in the
enquiry." He further argued that such powers included the authoriza-
tion of limited hostilities, which he, too, obviously regarded as war,
for he explicitly referred to the recent conflict with France as "'war.'
' 24
Evidence from the years immediately following ratification of the
Constitution thus corroborates the conclusion that Americans orig-
inally understood Congress to have at least a coordinate, and probably
the dominant, role in initiating all but the most obviously defensive
wars, whether declared or not. Since that time, and especially during
the twentieth century, the presidential role in war-making has never-
theless become dominant. Somewhat in the manner of Teddy Roosevelt
and the Panama Canal, while Congress and others have debated, Presi-
120. Id., col. 1828 (Representative James A. Bayard).
121. 1 NAVAL DocuMaNTS RELATED TO THE QUASz-WAR I3mET'Ex "flE U.zmrn STATES
AND FRANCE 75-76 (1935) (letter from Hamilton to Sec'y of War J. McHenry. May 17,
1798). See also id. at 78 (letter from Sec'y of War J. McHenry to Captain R. Dale. USN.
May 22, 1798). On the general conclusions contained in this paragraph. see Russell,
supra note 6, at 65-100 (for the Federalist period 1789-1801) and 102-46 (for the Republican
period, 1801-1815).
122. 4 U.S. (4 Dal.) 37 (1800).
123. See, e.g.:
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may wage a limited
war; limited in place, in objects, and in time. If a general war is declared, its extent
and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a brand
of the law of nations; but if a partial [war] is waged, its extent and operation depend
on our municipal laws [as passed by Congress].
Id. at 43 (Chase, J.).
124. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28, 32 (1801). On the conflict's status as
war, see 1 Op. ATr'y GEx. 84 (1798) (C. Lee to Sec'y of State).
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dents have acted. How long this situation will continue is difficult
to predict, though the constitutionality of recent practice is an intrigu-
ing question which promises to attract further national attention. -" o
Whether the original understanding properly concludes the issue
undeniably involves questions quite different from those I have here
discussed. Still, paying it some heed is surely consonant with a devotion
to constitutionalism.
125. On April 13, 1972, the Senate passed a bill to regulate undeclared war. See S.
2956, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ("A bill to make rules governing the use of the Armed
Forces of the United States in the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress").
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). Though the bill passed 68.16, resistance
from both the House and the Executive is likely. See Bickel, The Need for a War-Powers
Bill, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1972, at 17. For earlier bills and resolutions of this sort,
see, e.g., S. 731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. J. Res. 95, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971): and
nineteen House bills and resolutions reprinted in 1970 Hearings on Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the War Powers, supra note 4, at 435-76.
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